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DISCUSSION OF RECENT DECISIONS
CORPOIRATIONS---CORPORATE POWERS AND LIABILITIES--EFFECT OF PUB-
LC LIABILITY INSURANCE ON LIABILITY OF CHARITABLE CORPORATION FOR
THE NEGLIGENCE OF ITS AGENTS--In Piper v. Epstein,1 an administrator
sought to recover damages for a wrongful death resulting from the negli-
gent performance of a caesarean operation. A judgment had been entered
on a verdict found against the operating surgeon, the hospital corporation,
and two nurses. The doctor arranged a settlement, so the judgment was
vacated and the suit dismissed as to her. The hospital corporation then
moved for vacation of the judgment and for a new trial or, in the alterna-
tive, that the judgment be reduced by the amount of the settlement. Motion
for new trial was denied but the judgment was reduced by reason of the
settlement. The hospital corporation and the nurses appealed, the former
contending that, as it was a charitable corporation, the rule of respondeat
superior was inapplicable, while the latter claimed that it was error to deny
1326 Ill. App. 400, 62 N. E. (2d) 139 (1945).
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them the benefit of the statute of limitations. 2 Plaintiff admitted that the
hospital was a charitable institution, but alleged that it had carried insur-
ance to protect itself against loss from such negligent acts as were the basis
of suit. Judgment againt the hospital corporation was reversed on the
ground that the existence of insurance did not serve to create a liability
where none previously existed.
The effect of insurance upon the liability of a charitable corporation
for the negligence of its agents was first brought to the attention of the
Illinois reviewing courts in the case of Myers v. Young Men's Christian
Association of Quincy8 where it was indicated that it was improper to
make allegation of the existence of insurance as it would tend to prejudice
the rights of the defendant.4 The instant case, therefore, merely pro-
vides another reason for achieving the same result, i. e. maintaining the
immunity that has been accorded to charitable corporations in this state
since the decision in Parks v. Northwestern University.5 A recent Missouri
case might have furnished other reasons, if they were necessary or desir-
able, for it was there suggested that to permit recovery would, in effect,
turn the insurance policy into a third-party beneficiary contract, thereby
imposing new obligations upon the parties concerned.6 No deep-seated
investigation into the fundamental problem is found in decisions of that
character, however, so it is not surprising that the law on the subject
remains unchanged.
Rules of immunity granted to charitable corporations7 have developed
from "misconception or misapplication of previously established princi-
ples ' 8 and are principally based upon the dictum of Lord Cottenham in
the oft-cited case of The Feoffees of Heriot's Hospital v. Ross.9 They
have grown to the point of becoming "an almost hopelessly tangled mass
of reason and unreason,"' 10 at least in this country, for they have long
2 This aspect of the case was discussed in 24 CHIOAGo-KENT LAW RLVIEw 170.
3 316 Ill. App. 177, 44 N. E. (2d) 755 (1942), noted in 21 CHICAGO-KENT LAW
Rzgvmw 256, 10 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 211.
4 Other aspects of the problem of the prejudice which may arise from reference
to liability insurance are discussed in Smithers v. Henriquez, 368 Ill. 588, 15 N. E.
(2d) 499 (1938), noted in 16 CHICAGo-KENT LAW RgvEw 371, and in Kavanaugh
v. Parret, 379 Ill. 273, 40 N. E. (2d) 500 (1942), noted in 20 CHICAGO-KENT LAW
Rrnviw 371.
5218 Ill. 381, 75 N. E. 991, 2 1, R. A. (N. S.) 556, 4 Am. Cas. 103 (1905).
6 Stedem v. Jewish Memorial Hospital Ass'n, - Mo. App. -, 187 S. W. (2d) 469
(1945).
7 Discussion of divergent views may be found in 11 C. J. 374, 14 A. L. R. 572.
133 A. L. R. 821, 145 A. L. R. 1333, and in a note in 12 St. John's L. Rev. 99.
s Rutledge, J., speaking for the court in President and Dir. of Georgetown College
v. Hughes, 130 F. (2d) 810 at 815 (1942).
9 12 Clark & P. 507, 8 Eng. Rep. 1508 (1846), criticized In 14 A. L. R. 574.
10 Zollman, American Law of Charities (Bruce Pub. Co., Milwaukee, Wis., 1924),
§ 813.
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since been repudiated in England." In much the same way, confusion
is evident on the specific problem involved in the instant case, that is
whether the presence of insurance should operate to negative an immunity
otherwise enjoyed.
If the policy is one of indemnity only, the existence thereof probably
should not operate to extinguish an acknowledged immunity since such a
contract contemplates that the insurer shall only be obliged to reimburse
the insured for losses for which the latter would be legally liable.12 In
states following the "trust fund" theory of immunity, therefore, the
existence of indemnity insurance does not destroy that immunity for it
would be regarded as necessary to use the so-called "trust fund" to satisfy
the judgment against the corporation before any right to indemnity could
arise and the danger that the "trust fund" would not be replenished
could be regarded as outweighing the claim of the injured person to com-
pensation for the torts of the corporation's agents.
13
Most insurance policies written today, however, are of the liability
rather than the indemnity type14 so that the injured person may, upon
recovering judgment against the charitable corporation, proceed to enforce
the same against the insurer. Such a policy cannot be regarded as part of
the "trust fund," is not within the ambit of any immunity created for
the benefit thereof, and payment of the judgment through the proceeds
thereof will not depreciate the corporation's assets. Some states have, con-
sequently, held that the existence of such insurance operates to destroy
any immunity which might otherwise have existed.15 Particularly is this
true where it is possible to join the insurer as a proper party defendant
in the tort action, for it has there been held that the immunity can be
claimed only by the charity and not by the insurer.' 6 Certainly if, by
statute, the insurance policy must contain an "immunity endorsement"
whereby the insurer is precluded from asserting the insured's immunity,
11 Mersey Docks Trustees v. Gibb, 11 H. L. Cas. 686, 11 Eng. Rep. 1500 (1866).
12 See, for example, Levy v. Superior Court, 74 Cal. App. 171, 239 P. 1100 (1925)
Williams v. Church Home for Females, 223 Ky. 355, 3 S. W. (2d) 753 (1928)
Enman v. Trustees of Boston University, 270 Mass. 299, 170 N. E. 43 (1930)
DeGroot v. Edison Institute, 306 Mich. 339, 10 N. W. (2d) 907 (1943) ; Emrick v.
Pennsylvania R. Y. M. C. A. of Crestline, 69 Ohio App. 353, 43 N. E. (2d) 733
(1942) ; Miller v. Sisters of St. Francis, 5 Wash. (2d) 204, 105 P. (2d) 32 (1940)
Schan v. Morgan, 241 Wis. 334, 6 N. W. (2d) 212 (1942).
13 Levy v. Superior Court, 74 Cal. App. 171, 239 P. 1100 (1925): Williams v.
Church Home for Females, 223 Ky. 355, 3 S. W. (2d) 753, 62 A. L. R. 721 (1928).
14 Indemnity policies are forbidden in Illinois by reason of Ill. Rev. Stat. 1945,
Ch. 73, § 1000.
15 O'Connor v. Boulder Colorado Sanitarium Association, 105 Colo. 259, 96 P. (2d)
835, 133 A. L. R. 819 (1939) ; Anderson v. Armstrong, 180 Tenn. 56, 171 5. W. (2d)
401 (1943); McLeod v. St. Thomas Hospital, 170 Tenn. 423, 95 S. W. (2d) 917
(1936). See also Vanderbilt University v. Henderson, 23 Tenn. App. 135, 127 S. W.
(2d) 284 (1938).
16 Lusk v. U. S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co., (La. App.) 199 So. 666 (1941).
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recovery against the insurance carrier is not improper even though judg-
ment against the charitable corporation is necessary to fix the amount of
the liability of the carrier.'
7
In the absence of such specialized situations, much may depend on the
type of insurance contract. If the insurance carrier has agreed to defend
suits instituted against the charity, it might be said that it was the obliga-
tion of the insurer to insist upon the defense of immunity,' 8 otherwise it
may be failing to conduct an adequate defense. But if the purpose .)f
the insurance policy is no more significant than that of protecting against
the expense of litigation, such a contract comes close to placing the insurer
in the category of practicing law for fees paid in the form of premiums.,,
It is more likely that the charitable corporation obtains such insurance
with intent to benefit the third person injured by the torts of its agents.
If so, that produces an apparent circle which would need to be broken if
the corporation were not to be accused of wasting "trust funds" by idly
buying unneeded insurance protection. The fact of insurance and the
asserted immunity are inconsistent with each other unless the former can
be said to produce a waiver of the other.
A person is free to waive rights and privileges due to him, whether
secured by contract, conferred by statute, or guaranteed by the constitu-
tion, so long as the waiver is intelligently made and is not contrary to
some fundamentally opposed public policy. 20 The growing trend is against
immunity even in situations like the present one, for "the law's emphasis
ordinarily is on liability, not immunity, from wrong-doing."21 It cannot
be said, therefore, that any overwhelming public policy would deny to the
charitable corporation the right to waive its immunity if the latter saw fit
to do so. The "trust fund" theory itself has been so weakened and limited
by decisions that it is "not likely to hereafter have much practical applica-
tion or importance. "22 Charities have not disappeared in jurisdictions
where recovery has been allowed nor have they been seriously incapaci-
tated from performing the functions they have assumed to perform on
behalf of the general public. If liability is to depend on the character of
17 Taylor v. Knox County Board of Education, 292 Ky. 767, 167 S. W. (2d) 700,
145 A. L. R. 1333 (1942).
18 Schau v. Morgan, 241 Wis. 334, 6 N. W. (2d) 212 (1942).
19 People v. People's Stock Yards State Bank, 344 Ill. 462, 176 N. E. 901 (1931);
People v. Motorists' Ass'n of Illinois, 354 Ill. 595, 188 N. E. 827 (1934); People v.
Chicago Motor Club, 362 Ill. 50, 199 N. E. 1 (1935). See also Ii. Rev. Stat. 1945,
Ch. 32, § 411 et seq.
20 31 C. a. S., Estoppel, § 67b, p. 258.
21 Rutledge, J., in 130 F. (2d) 810 at 827.
22 Olsen, Ch. J., in Geiger v. Simpson Methodist-Episcopal Church, 174 Minn. 389
at 396, 219 N. W. 463 at 466 (1928). See also Nicholson v. Good Samaritan Hos-
pital, 145 Fla. 360, 199 So. 344 (1940).
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the act done rather than the title of the actor,23 no insuperable difficulty
is presented to defeat the conclusion that the immunity heretofore recog-
nized can be waived.
The problem then becomes one as to whether a waiver has, in fact,
occurred. No doubt an express waiver could be found where the corpora-
tion stipulates that the insurance carrier shall not assert the defense of
immunity 24 or is obliged, by statute, to so require. 25 A waiver might even
be found by implication if the charity does not assert the defense when
sued or submits to default judgment,26 although the net result would be to
allow a diversion of trust funds. Why, then, may not the action of the
charity in procuring insurance in any form other than indemnity insurance
be taken as indicating a tacit waiver of the defense it might otherwise
make? The law is so settled in this state, at least up to now, that the
charitable corporation is entitled to claim immunity,2 7 that the act of
obtaining insurance could well be said to indicate an intention to make an
intelligent waiver of that privilege28 so as to prevent its later assertion.
It might be argued that to permit such waiver would thwart the
donor's purpose in endowing the charity with funds and permit dissipation
thereof improperly. It is doubtful if the donor ever considered the possi-
bility that actions might be brought against the charity he sought to favor.
If he had done so, he would have known that the charitably-inclined
individual is held to answer for his negligent acts, 2 9 hence ought not to
expect that an artificial person should be protected if it was, in fact,
at fault. The ordinary private corporation is not so protected, yet the
quasi-public charity is given total immunity for as soon as the fact of its
charitable purpose is established all other issues go by the board.3 0 The
donor might justly feel that such should be the result where the injured
person is a true recipient of charity, but it is a little too much to expect
the same result to follow where -the recipient pays a substantial fee for
23 Dillon v. Rockaway Beach Hospital & Dispensary, 284 N. Y. 176, 30 N. E. (2d)
373 (1940); Heinemann v. Jewish Agr. Soc., Inc., 178 Misc. 897, 37 N. Y. S. (2d)
354 (1942).
24 Such is understood to be the case with reference to local Catholic charities:
21 CHICAGO-KENT LAw REviEw 256 at 258.
25 Taylor v. Knox County Board of Education, 292 Ky. 767, 167 S. W. (2d) 700,
145 A. L. R. 1333 (1942).
26Marabia v. Mary Thompson Hospital, 309 Ill. 147, 140 N. E. 836 (1923).
27 Hogan v. Chicago Lying-In Hospital & Dispensary, 335 Ill. 42, 166 N. E. 461
(1929) ; Tollefson v. City of Ottawa, 228 Ill. 134, 81 N. E. 823 (1907) ; Parks v.
Northwestern University, 218 fI1. 381, 75 N. E. 991 (1905) ; Mater v. Silver Cross
Hospital, 285 Ill. App. 437, 2 N. E. (2d) 138 (1936).
28 Lutheran Church v. Lutheran Church, 316 Ill. 196, 147 N. E. 53 (1925).
29 Owl Drug Co. v. Crandall, 52 Ariz. 322, 80 P. (2d) 952, 120 A. L. R. 1521
(1938) ; Gates v. Chesapeake & 0. Ry. Co., 185 Ky. 24, 213 S. W. 564, 5 A. L. R.
507 (1919).
30 Maretick v. South Chicago Community Hospital, 297 Ill. App. 488, 17 N. E.
(2d) 1012 (1938).
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the care or assistance of the charitable corporation.3 1 The latter should
not be allowed to inflict injury on some without right of redress in order
to be able to bestow charity on others,3 2 and no right-thinking donor
should so expect. He cannot claim that his charity has immunity from
the operation of the Dram Shop Act, even though diversion of "trust
funds" may thereby occur, 33 so it is unrealistic to expect more in other
tort situations. Exemption from taxation, conferred by statute, should be
all that the donor is entitled to ask for the protection of funds donated to
charity. Fear that such funds will be dissipated if immunity is cancelled
would seem to be greater than actual experience has shown. All such fear
would be allayed if the charity were required to carry sufficient insurance
to insure preservation of its funds, and the burden could then well be
shifted from the innocent victim to one paid to assume such risks.
As the courts persist in their refusal to permit the placing of liability
where it probably belongs, even though their action has been often and
ably criticized, 34 the matter has become one for legislative action. That
action might take the form of a total abolition of the immunity heretofore
recognized, putting all except public corporations on an equal plane. It
might take the form of compulsory insurance requirements including a
stipulation against raising the defense of immunity. Maybe the immunity
should be abolished only in cases where the charitable corporation has
voluntarily procured insurance and then only to the extent of the coverage
obtained. It might, perhaps, be cancelled only in favor of the "paying"
victim rather than for the beneficiary of true charity. Perhaps the courts
themselves might act if, as in Louisiana, it is made possible to name the
insurance carrier as a defendant in the tort action.3 5 But these are matters
for legislative determination. Action of some sort is clearly desirable and
should come soon.
Miss E. KUCABA
31 The action may not, however, be predicated upon contract, if the breach
thereof lies in the negligence of the corporation's agents, according to Wattman v.
St. Luke's Hospital Ass'n, 314 Ill. App. 244, 41 N. E. (2d) 314 (1942), overruling
Armstrong v. Wesley Hospital, 170 Ill. App. 81 (1912).
32 Cohen v. General Hospital Society of Connecticut, 113 Conn. 188, 154 A. 435
(1931).
33 Klopp v. Benevolent Protective Order of Elks, 309 I1. App. 145, 33 N. E. (2d)
161 (1941).
34 Judges have been as vocal as other writers. See President and Dir. of George-
town College v. Hughes, 130 F. (2d) 810 (1942); Nicholson v. Good Samaritan
Hospital, 145 Fla. 360, 199 So. 344 (1940) ; Andrews v. Y. M. C. A. of Des Moines,
226 Iowa 374, 284 N. W. 186 (1939). See also notes in 20 Ill. L. Rev. 373 and
21 CHICAGo-KENT LAw REviEw 256.
35 Lusk v. U. S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co., (La. App.) 199 So. 666 (1941).
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CORPORATIONS-OFFICERS AND AGENTS-WHETHER OR NOT CORPORATE
DIRECTORS, KNOWLNG OF AN ASSURED SALE OF CORPORATE ASSETS AT AN
ENHANCED PRICE, ARE UNDER DUTY TO INFORM SHAREHOLDER THEREOF
WHEN PURCHASING His STocK-The Appellate Court for the First Dis-
trict recently gave recognition to a novel exception to general principles
of corporate law when it decided the case of Agatucci v. Corradi.1 The
plaintiff and the defendants there concerned had been directors and officers
of a transportation company, each owning one-third of the capital stock.
Plaintiff retired from active participation in the corporation's affairs in
1939 and moved to another city. He subsequently offered to sell his
shares of stock to the defendants but although they at first rejected the
suggestion they later importuned him to sell. A price having been agreed
upon and paid, plaintiff transferred his shares to defendants and resigned
as director. Within a month, the physical assets of the corporation were
sold to another corporation at a price substantially greater than that which
had been used as the basis for arriving at the selling price for plaintiff's
stock. Plaintiff had no knowledge of this transaction until after its com-
pletion although negotiations for the sale of the assets had been undertaken
by defendants on behalf of the corporation prior to the purchase of
plaintiff's shares. Upon discovery of these facts, plaintiff brought an
equitable action, founded upon fraud and deceit, to force defendants to
pay him the difference between the sale price paid for his shares and the
true value thereof as indicated by the price obtained at the sale of the cor-
porate assets. A motion by defendants to dismiss the complaint for want of
equity was denied and, after hearing, a decree was entered awarding
plaintiff an amount representing a proportionate share of the profits real-
ized in excess of the consideration already received. Upon appeal, that
decree was affirmed despite the contention of the defendants that, while
they might be trustees in respect to the corporate business and property,
they were not such with respect to plaintiff's individual holdings, so were
at liberty to purchase his stock without being obliged to disclose informa-
tion relating to the pending sale provided no actual misrepresentation was
perpetrated. Affirmance was predicated on the fact that while the rule
was generally as contended for by defendants, there was an exception
thereto in cases where some special circumstance existed such as an assured
sale at an enhanced price known only to the directors and not ascertain-
able from an inspection of the books of the corporation.
That exception has never before been invoked in Illinois, for prior to
the determination of the instant case the rule had been that directors were
not to be regarded as trustees with respect to an individual shareholder so
were liable to him, when purchasing his shares, only for actual fraud.2
1327 Ill. App. 153, 63 N. E. (2d) 630 (1945).
2 Bawden v. Taylor, 254 I1. 464, 98 N. E. 941 (1912) ; Hooker v. Midland Steel
Co., 215 Ill. 444, 74 N. E. 445, 106 Am. St. Rep. 170 (1905).
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A different rule existed, however, if the directors made the purchase on
behalf of the corporation.3 Although directors frequently have been re-
ferred to as "trustees" in this state and have been placed under the duties
usually imposed upon fiduciaries, all such references have been confined
to cases where the interests of the directors have conflicted with those of
the shareholders as a group rather than in relation to any particular stock-
holder. 4
A wealth of material has been written on the specific problem of the
relationship existing between a director and a stockholder, at the time of a
purchase of shares,5 for a distinct division of authority exists at this point.
The weight of authority clearly indicates that, in the absence of actual
fraud, no fiduciary relationship exists and the parties are free to deal at
arm's length.0  The reasons supporting that view seem to be that, under
the corporate entity theory, the director's duties grow out of his relation-
ship to the entity rather than to the individual members composing the
same,7 or else that to hold otherwise would prevent the director from buy-
ing shares on the open market." Support is also said to rest in the fact that,
as the books of the corporation are open to inspection, the shareholder is
under a responsibility to inform himself as to the condition of the com-
pany,9 so should not be entitled to rely upon the director for pertinent
information governing the sale price.
The minority view, by contrast, assumes that a fiduciary relationship
3 Wood v. MacLean Drug Co., 266 Ill. App. 5 (1932), cert. den. 266 Ill. App. xli.
4 Dixmoor Golf Club v. Evans, 325 Ill. 612, 156 N. E. 785 (1927): Becker v.
Billings, 304 Ill. 190, 136 N'. E. 581 (1922) . Voorhees v. Mason. 245 Ii. 256. .91 N. E.
1056 (1910); Hess v. Aquitania Apartments Co.. 313 Ill. App. 267, 39 N. E. (2d)
724 (1942), abst. opinion; Bingham v. Ditzler. 309 Ill. App. 581, 33 N. E. (2d) 939
(1941) ; Ingebretsen v. Lenc, 308 Ill. App. 510. 32 N. E. (2d) 329 (1941) ; Charter
Gas Engine Co. v. Charter, 47 Ill. App. 36 (1893).
Textual treatment may be found in Fletcher. Cyclopedia of the Law of Private
Corporations, Perm. Ed., Vol. III, § 1168. Leading articles and comments may be
found in 10 Corn. L. Q. 509; 8 Mich. L. Rev. 267; 28 Mich. L. Rev. 449: 14 Minn.
L. Rev. 530; 27 Yale L. J. 731; 32 Yale L. J. 637; and 39 Yale L. J. 582.
6 See Fletcher, op. cit., Vol. III, § 1168. Recovery is permitted where actual
fraud is present: Taggart v. Francis Draz & Co.. 166 App. Div. 381. 150 N. Y. S.
41 (1914); but see also Nicholson v. Kentucky Mine Supply Co., 287 Ky. 777, 155
S. W. (2d) 41 (1941).
7 Hooker v. Midland Steel Co., 215 Il. 444, 74 N. E. 445. 106 Am. St. Rep. 170
(1905).
8 See Carpenter v. Danforth, 52 Barb. (N. Y.) 581 (1868), particularly p. 586.
9 In Hooker v. Midland Steel Co., 215 Ill. 444 at 453. 74 N. E. 445 at 448, the
court said: "He had a right of access to the books, records, and papers of the
corporation for any investigation he chose to make . . . It was not alleged that
there was any refusal of the privilege . . . and, if there had been, it would arouse
the suspicion of a reasonable man. . . ." Submission of false records, however,
would work a contrary result: McMynn v. Richardson-Phenix Co., 186 Wis. 442,
201 N. W. 272 (1924).
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exists, hence imposes a duty to make full disclosure'0 either because it
would be inequitable to permit the director to profit from information
obtained by reason of his capacity," because the special circumstance
cannot always be learned from an inspection of the books,12 or because to
hold otherwise might tend to discourage investment.13 Necessarily, that
view completely disregards the corporate entity theory and places directors
and stockholders on the same plane as partners or joint adventurers, with
the usual duties attendant thereon.' 4  Further argument to support the
minority view has been said to exist in the fact that the information pos-
sessed by the director is a "quasi-asset" belonging to the corporation,
hence is held in trust for the benefit of the stockholder just as would be
the case for other and more tangible property.
While the Illinois court, in the instant case, has not changed from the
majority to the minority view, it has adopted a third concept which lies
between them. That concept had its origin in the decision of the United
States Supreme Court in the case of Strong v. Repide,' 5 where it was
apparently developed in order to avoid the harsh and often inequitable
results arising from an application of the majority rule without going to
the other extreme. As enunciated there, a director is under no duty to
disclose known facts at the time of the purchase of the stock unless there
is some "special circumstance" which, from its very nature, operates to
created a fiduciary relationship. A "special circumstance" of the type
contemplated by that view has been found to exist where the director seeks
out the shareholder for the purpose of buying his shares.' 6 The fact that
the director and the shareholder are the sole owners of the stock may be
significant.' 7 Existence of a superior position on the part of the director
by reason of the fact that he is a majority shareholder may suffice.' 8 Such
"special circumstance" has also been found present where the corpora-
tion is inactive,' 9 or the undisclosed pending transaction involves the dis-
1o Oliver v. Oliver, 118 Ga. 362, 45 S. E. 232 (1903); Humphrey v. Baron, 223
Iowa 735, 273 N. W. 856 (1937) ; Bettendorf v. Bettendorf, 190 Iowa 83, 179 N. W.
444 (1920); Dawson v. National Life Ins. Co., 176 Iowa 362, 157 N. W. 929,
L. R. A. 1916E 878 (1916); Hotchkiss v. Fischer, 136 Kan. 530, 16 P. (2d) 531
(1932) ; Jacquith v. Mason, 99 Neb. 509, 156 N. W. 1041 (1916) ; Poole v. Camden,
79 W. Va. 310, 92 S. E. 454, L. R. A. 1917E 988 (1917) ; Hacker v. Kyle, 211 Wis.
584, 248 N. W. 134 (1933).
11 Wilgus, "Purchase of Shares of a Corporation by a Director," 8 Mich. L. Rev.
267 at 297 (1910), suggests that for a director to "take advantage of his position
to secure the profits all have won, offends the moral sense."
12 Buckley v. Buckley, 230 Mich. 504, 202 N. W. 955 (1925).
13 Note in 14 Minn. L. Rev. 530 at 534.
14 Dutton v. Barnes, 162 Minn. 430, 203 N. W. 414 (1925).
i 213 U. S. 419, 29 S. Ct. 521, 53 L. Ed. 853 (1909).
16 George v. Ford, 36 D. C. App. 315 (1911).
17 Ibid.
is McMynn v. Richardson-Phenix Co., 186 Wis. 442, 201 N. W. 272 (1924).
19 Strong v. Repide, 213 U. S. 419, 29 S. Ct. 521, 53 L. Ed. 853 (1909) ; Bollstrom
v. Duplex Power Car Co., 208 Mich. 15, 175 N. W. 492 (1919).
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position of the entire corporate property.20 A pending merger, an assured
sale, or other facts tending to enhance the value of the stock 2 ' definitely
flit this pattern, even though the relationship of principal and agent does
not exist between the parties. 2 2 In all such cases, there is equitable reason
for imposing the duties of a fiduciary on the director purchasing the
shares and in each he has been obliged to account for the unconscionable
profit made on the transaction.
By adopting this concept in the instant case, the Illinois court has
applied a wise and workable rule which eliminates the criticisms directed
against both the majority and the minority doctrines. The desirable fea-
tures of both these rules have been retained while still providing protection
for both parties. If the circumstances lend themselves to the practice of
deception, inequitable results may be avoided. On the other hand, wide
latitude still remains for arm's-length dealing between directors and
shareholders without forcing full disclosure in all cases.
J. B. WYATT, JR.
LANDLORD AND TENANT-TERMS FOR YEARS-WHETEER APPROPRIA-
TION or TEMPORARY USE OF PREMISES UNDER POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN
ABSOLVES TENANT FROM OBLIGATION TO PAY RENT--The United States
government, in the prosecution of the war, found it compulsory to file nu-
merous petitions to condemn the temporary use of real property,' often
including personal property located thereon, 2 whenever such property was
deemed necessary for military, naval, or other war purposes. Heretofore,
the fee itself had been condemned, but the taking of only a temporary use
has provided a means of achieving substantial saving to the public trea-
sury, hence the extended use of this device. Such procedure, however, has
posed new problems as is evidenced by the recent case of Leonard v. Auto-
car Sales & Service Company.3 According to that case, the lessor granted
a written lease for a long term under which the defendant had entered
into possession. Lessee paid the rental due under the lease up to March,
1943, but refused to pay thereafter because an order had been entered
awarding the United States government the immediate temporary use of
the entire demised premises for a portion of the term with the right to
20 Gadsden v. Bennetto and Wellband, 23 Man. L. Rep. 33, 9 Dom. L. Rep. 719
(1913).
21 Mulvane v. O'Brien, 58 Kan. 463, 49 P. 607 (1897).
22 Dutton v. Barnes, 162 Minn. 430, 203 N. W. 414 (1925). Obviously, if the
director acts as agent for purpose of sale, he may not become an undisclosed pur-
chaser: Strong v. Repide, 213 U. S. 419, 29 S. Ct. 521, 53 L. Ed. 853 (1909).
'Authority for such action may be found in 50 U. S. C. A., app. § 632.
2 United States v. Certain Parcels of Land, etc., 55 F. Supp. 257 (1944).
3 392 Ill. 182, 64 N. E. (2d) 477 (1946), affirming 325 Ill. App. 375, 60 N. E. (2d)
457 (1945).
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extend the use for additional yearly periods. After being dispossessed
under that order, defendant purchased another building in order to carry
on its business. When the lessor sued for the unpaid rent, defendant an-
swered that it had been evicted by paramount right as a consequence of
which the relationship of landlord and tenant had been destroyed. Plain-
tiff moved to strike the answer, which motion was sustained. Defendant
elected to stand by the answer and suffered judgment. On appeal, the
Appellate Court for the First District affirmed and, on certificate of im-
portance, the Illinois Supreme Court did likewise.
The rule has, therefore, now been announced that in this state the con-
demnation of leased premises for temporary use, provided such use is for
a term less than the balance of the unexpired term of the lease, even
though it carries the right to make renewals which might extend beyond
the expiration date, does not terminate the lease or put an end to the
landlord-tenant relationship. As a necessary corollary to that doctrine,
any right of claim against the government for the reasonable value of the
use taken lies in the tenant and not the landlord.4
There is no doubt that exercise of the sovereign power of eminent do-
main does not depend upon constitutional or statutory provisions,5 al-
though it may be limited thereby. As a consequence, all private property
is held subject to this power and all private rights must yield whenever
it is exercised in the public interest.6 The attendant problem it develops,
however, is to determine just where the loss or inconvenience must fall.
No citation of authority is necessary to support the statement that the
taking of the fee upon which a leasehold estate has been erected operates
to destroy the relationship of landlord and tenant. A more difficult prob-
lem arises where only a portion of the fee has been taken. But it is well
settled in Illinois that the condemnation of a part of the leased premises,
provided a part capable of being occupied under the lease remains, does
not operate to relieve the tenant from the obligation to pay the full rental
and no apportionment or abatement is allowed. 7 Such view is in full
4 The measure of damage accruing to the tenant Is extensively discussed in
United States v. General Motors Corp., - U. S. -, 65 S. Ct. 357, 89 L. Ed. (adv.)
379 (1945), noted in 13 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 242, 39 Ii. L. Rev. 420, 23 Texas L.
Rev. 402, and 31 Va. L. Rev. 539.
5 Kohl v. United States, 91 U. S. 367, 23 L. Ed. 449 (1876).
6 Olson Land Co. v. Alki Park Co., 63 Wash. 521, 115 P. 1083, Ann. Cas. 1912D
365 (1911); Corrigan v. City of Chicago, 144 Ill. 537, 33 N. E. 746, 21 L. R. A.
212 (1893).
7 Yellow Cab Co. v. Stafford-Smith Co., 320 Ill. 294, 150 N. E. 670, 43 A. L.
R. 1173 (1926) ; Chicago West Division R. Co. v. Metropolitan West Side El.
R. Co., 152 I1. 519, 38 N. E. 736 (1894); Corrigan v. City of Chicago, 144 Ill.
537, 33 N. E. 746, 21 L. R. A. 212 (1893); Stubbings v. Village of Evanston, 1363
Ii. 37, 26 N. E. 577, 11 L. R. A. 839, 29 Am. St. Rep. 300 (1891) ; City of Chicago
v. Garrity, 7 Ill. App. 474 (1880).
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agreement with the weight of authority from other jurisdictions.8 There
is only a partial taking as to the quantity of the estate in such situations,
but there is a complete taking in the sense of time as to the part so taken.
In the instant case, on the other hand, there is a complete taking of the
entire estate in the sense of quantity, but only a partial taking in the time
sense. If release of the tenant's obligation required a complete taking both
as to quantity and duration, the analogy appears strong in the two situa-
tions and should invoke the same rule. Such, at least, was the conclusion
reached by the Appellate Court.
Although this rule may cause some hardship to the tenant, as where
he has been forced to purchase other facilities, the award in the condem-
nation proceeding serves to compensate him for the rent he is obliged to
pay even though he is out of possession. 9 Any change, then, would require
statutory enactment or else suitable revision of the terms of existing forms
of leases' ° for none is likely to come from judicial action.
It has been urged that the doctrine of commercial frustration should
be applied to leases as well as to other contracts. English courts have held
that such doctrine could have no application to the ordinary building
lease 1 because of the common-law theory that a lease is primarily a con-
veyance of an interest in land and creates a chattel real.12 So, too, in this
state, a leasing agreement involves more than an ordinary contract for it
establishes in the tenant a possessory interest in land which has been said
6 City of Pasadena v. Porter,. 201 Cal. 381, 257 P. 526, 53 A. L. R. 679 (1927)
Gluck v. Mayor of Baltimore, 81 Md. 315, 32 A. 515, 48 Am. St. Rep. 515 (1895)
Ellis v. Welch, 6 Mass. 246, 4 Am. Dec. 122 (1810); Parks v. City of Boston, 32
Mass. (15 Pick.) 198 (1834) ; Patterson v. City of Boston, 37 Mass. (20 Pick.)
159 (1838); W. M. McDonald Co. v. Hawkins, 287 Mass. 71, 191 N. E. 405 (1934) ;
Lehigh Valley R. Co. v. Metropolitan Lumber Co.. 8 N. J. Misc. 55, 148 A, 568
(1930) ; Steifel v. Metz, 7 Ohio Dec. Rep. 308 (1.877) ; Schmid v. Thorsen, 89 Ore.
575, 170 P. 930 (1918), motion to recall mandate denied 175 P. 74 (1918) ; Work-
man v. Mifflin, 30 Pa. St. 362 (1858) ; Schuylkill & D. Improv. & R. Co. v. Schmoele,
57 Pa. St. 271 (1868) ; Dyer v. Wightman, 66 Pa. St. 425 (1870) ; Olson Land Co.
v. Alki Park Co., 63 Wash. 521, 115 P. 1083, Ann. Cas. 1912D 365 (1911). Ap-
portionment of an award between landlord and tenant under a long-term lease,
where part of the demised premises was taken by eminent domain, was made fir
Pierson v. H. R. Leonard Furniture Co., 268 Mich. 507, 256 N. W. 529 (1934),
noted in 33 Mich. L. Rev. 1087.
9 United States v. General Motors Corp., - U. S. -, 65 S. Ct. 357, 89 L. Ed.
(adv.) 379 (1945). See also Vold, "Condemnation of Buildings for War Pur-
poses," 23 Neb. L. Rev. 34 (1944) ; Bertero, "Condemnation of Leasehold Prem-
ises," 1 So. Cal. L. Rev. 141 (1928).
10 United States v. Improved Premises, etc., 54 F. Supp. 469 (1944) ; Gillespie
v. Thomas, 15 Wend. (N. Y.) 464 (1836). See also Dolan, "Present Day Court
Practice in Condemnation Suits," 31 Va. L. Rev. 9 (1944).
11 London and Northern Estates v. Schlesinger, 1 K. B. [19161 20; Whitehall
Court, Ltd. v. Ettlinger, 1 K. B. 11920] 680; Matthey v. Curling, 2 A. C. [1922]
180; Swift v. MacBean, 1 K. B. [1942] 375.
12 Tiffany, Real Property. 3d Ed., Vol. 1. § 74; Walsh, A Treatise on the Law of
Property (Baker, Voorhis & Co., New York, 1927), 2d Ed., p. 233, § 146.
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to partake of the nature of real estate, 18 or serves as a sale of the right to
use and occupy the premises for a certain time.14 Viewed in this light, a
lease can well be said to be a form of conveyance of an interest in the land
demised. 1
There is a tendency, however, to treat leases as being no different than
other contracts so that the doctrine of frustration could apply. Other
American courts have not denied its application to leases of real property,
although such action has been primarily the result of rationing regulations
and freezing orders made necessary by the prosecution of the war 18 rather
than by reason of condemnation proceedings. The doctrine has at least
received recognition by a noted author of a text on the law of contracts,17
and would not seem inapplicable to instances where the tenant has been
dispossessed by condemnation proceedings. To say that the obligation to
pay rent is ended because the estate is gone, is not far different from say-
ing that the obligation should disappear when the economIc advantage
derived through the lease has been swept away. Ancient concepts born of
feudalism, where ownership of an estate in land carried more than mere
economic advantages, could well be reviewed in a more modern light.
H. H. FLENTYE.
LIMITATION OF ACTIONS-COMPUTATION OF PERIOD OF LIMITATION-
WHETHER OR NOT SUBSEQUENT CIRCULATION OF LIBELOUS PUBLICATION
ALREADY GIVEN GENERAL DISTRIBUTION SERVES TO PREVENT RUNNING OF
PERIOD OF LIMITATION-In the case of Winrod v. McFadden Publications,
Inc.,' the defendant had composed and printed an issue of its magazine
bearing the publication date of August 8, 1942. That issue was distributed
by mail or through agencies so as to become available to the general public
on July 29, 1942. Plaintiff, alleging that a certain article therein libelled
him, brought suit on August 4, 1943. Defendant made a motion for sum-
mary judgment on the ground that the cause of action was barred by the
statute of limitations. 2 That motion was supported by uncontroverted
13 People ex rel. Harding v. City of Chicago, 335 Ill. 450, 167 N. E. 79 (1929);
Shedd v. Patterson, 312 Ill. 371, 144 N. E. 5 (1924); People ex rel. Healy v.
Shedd, 241 Ill. 155; 89 N. E. 332 (1909) ; Holladay v. Chicago Arc Light & Power
Co., 55 Ill. App. 463 (1894). See also Ill. Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. 77, § 3.
14 Sunasack v. Morey, 196 Ill. 569, 63 N. E. 1039 (1902).
15 111. Life Ins. Co. v. Beifeld, 184 Ill. App. 582 (1914).
16 See note to Crosby v. Baron-Huot Oil Co., 324 Ill. App. 651, 59 N. E. (2d) 520
(1945), in 23 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REviEw 337 and cases there discussed. In addi-
tion, see Orme v. Atlas Gas & Oil Co.. 217 Minn. 27, 13 N. W. (2d) 757 (1944)
Farlou Realty Corp. v. Woodsam Associates, 49 N. Y. S. (2d) 367 (1944).
17 Williston, Contracts, Rev. Ed., Vol. 6, § 1955.
162 F. Supp. 249 (1945).
2 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. 83, § 14, requires that actions for slander and libel be
commenced within one year next after the cause of action accrued.
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affidavits fixing the respective dates of the original composition, printing
and distribution. Since these affidavits clearly disclosed that the limita-
tion period had elapsed as to any cause of action based thereon,3 the
trial court held that the motion had to be sustained in respect thereto. 4
The real controversy, however, arose over the actions of the defendant
subsequent to the original publication. The affidavit also stated that: "No
magazine of said issue was mailed to subscribers after July 28, 1942, with
the exception that where a subscriber reported either non-receipt of his
copy of said issue or receipt of a copy in a damaged condition, replacement
copies were mailed to these subscribers.'"' Acting on the assumption that
some of these copies, together with others ordered on back number, were
mailed after August 4, 1942, since the quoted statement in the affidavit
did not negative that possibility, the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division, held that such mailings, if
made, would constitute a new publication sufficient to support another
cause of action. Defendant's motion for summary judgment, therefore,
had to be denied.
Cases discussing the question of whether or not subsequent mailings
and the like by the original wrongdoer are a part of the original wrong,
or can be treated as additional wrongs, are comparatively rare. The opin-
ions therein, moreover, are not too well considered. The first jurisdiction
to face the issue was New York where it was decided, in Wolfson v. Syra-
cuse Newspapers, Inc.,6 that keeping a reading room where back issues
could be examined was not a new publication. That decision was followed
in three later cases possessing factual situations similar to the one in the
instant case but arriving at a contrary result.7 The reasoning behind these
cases proceeds from the negative approach that to hold other than that
3 Cannon v. Time, Inc., 39 F. Supp. 660 (1939); Means v. McFadden Publications,
Inc., 25 F. Supp. 993 (1939).
4 Foreman v. Mississippi Publishing Corp., 195 Miss. 90, 14 So. (2d) 344 (1943).
As the cause of action accrues when the libelous publication is exhibited to a third
person, the statutory period would begin to run not later than the time of the
distribution to the agencies.
5 62 F. Supp. 249.
6 254 App. Div. 211, 4 N. Y. S. (2d) 640 (1938). A dissenting opinion therein
proceeds on the theory that since a libel is published when it is read by some third
person other than the one defamed, it then becomes automatically actionable. This
may be all right for some purposes, but to apply that doctrine to modern mass
production of reading matter would not be practical.
7 Means v. McFadden Publications, Inc., 25 F. Supp. 993 (1939), indicates that
the purchase of old copies of a magazine which had already been published and
circulated would not suffice. Cannon v. Time, Inc., 39 F. Supp. 660 (1939), was a
case in which replacement copies were sent to subscribers who reported that they
had either not received their copies or had received them in damaged condition.
The copies sent were parts of the original edition and printing. In Backus v.
Look, Inc., 39 F. Supp. 662 (1941), the issue of the magazine complained of was
never reprinted, so the fact that several miscellaneous copies were mailed out later
in response to requests for the purchase of single copies was held not to constitute
a republication.
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there can be a republication without a reprinting would circumvent the
purpose of a statute of limitations by permitting a multiplicity of suits.9
Such a contention may not be without merit, but if the defendant is to be
protected in that fashion, any publisher, by printing enough copies on the
first run while distributing only a limited number, would soon have a
quantity of "tort-free" publications which he could disseminate through
the years. 9 These courts would admit that the subsequent distribution of
a second printing should permit plaintiff to maintain his action,10 so it
becomes rather a weak fiction to draw distinctions between two identical
copies of the same publication solely because of different dates of printing.
But it is much easier to suggest that the prior cases are wrong than
to support the instant case as being correct. If the plaintiff has two causes
of action now, one barred and one still existent, he acquired the second
cause of action the moment the first replacement copies were mailed. Upon
that theory, had more copies of the magazine been sent out in the week next
following, he could have maintained three suits, and so on ad infinitum.
Yet if the plaintiff, well within a year of the defendant's several acts,
had filed two or more separate suits for libel, it is inconceivable that the
could would have denied a motion by defendant to strike all but one of
the complaints upon the theory that there was a multiplicity of suits."
Moreover, the evidence indicates that the additional copies sent out went to
persons who were already subscribers and who either had not received their
original copies or had received them in damaged condition. These addi-
tional mailings were, in reality, more of an attempt to correct an abortive
effort to publish the libel than they were a republication of it. The de-
fendant's intent to publish is normally considered only as having bearing
on the question of damages, 12 yet, where it goes to prove not the commis-
sion of the tort but more basically the nature of the act done, it should not
be totally ignored. Had there been a showing that the defendant was
making copies available at a later date to the general public, as opposed
8 The court in Wolfson v. Syracuse Newspapers, Inc., 254 App. Div. 211 at 213,
4 N. Y. S. (2d) 640 at 642, used as an illustration to argue the point, the hypothet-
ical case of a publisher who had copies of a book on his shelves for twenty years
yet would be subject to suit every time a copy was sold. That court does not face
the problem as to whether the publisher is not, in fact, committing a new tort
each time he sells a copy.
9 There is no discussion of the effect of malice on the cause of action, so pre-
sumably the rule would apply even though the defendant published maliciously.
10 See dictum in Means v. McFadden Publications, Inc., 25 F. Supp. .993 at 995,
where the court said: "Had this defendant . .. issued another edition of the maga-
zine and re-issued, re-printed, and re-circulated the articles . . . then the result
would have been different."
11 See Galligan v. Sun Printing & Pub. Co., 25 Misc. 355, 54 N. Y. S. 471 (1898).
12 See 36 C. J., Libel and Slander, § 162, p. 1214.
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to subscribers, 18 the case for the plaintiff would have been strengthened. 14
The decision in the instant case, therefore, is predicated on the weakest
possible factual situation.
It is, however, basically founded on sound practical reasoning. That
the defendant should be liable for each tort that he commits is elementary.
That it cannot be the purview of a statute of limitations to permit a
wrongdoer to use the statute as an offensive weapon, fusing a multitude of
wrongs into one, is equally clear. A court, unable to deny that a reprint-
ing of libelous material creates a new cause of action should not be per-
mitted to say that, upon an identical set of facts except for the reprinting,
a completely opposite result must be attained. The fact that the decision
in the instant case could permit a multiplicity of suits should not, in
itself, be controlling if two or more torts are in fact committed.' 5 Unfor-
tunately, the case settles nothing. If anything, it unbalances what was, in
a modest way, the weight of authority. But there is no denying that it is
the best opinion on the subject to date, and it should be given serious
consideration as a step in the right direction.
J. SAFEBLADE
MASTER AND SERVANT-SERVICES AND COMPENSATION-WHETHER OR
NOT REFUSAL TO WORK ON SABBATH BECAUSE op RELIGIOUS BELIEFS PRE-
CLUDES SERVANT FROM UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATIN-The applicant for
unemployment compensation in the recent Ohio case of Kt v. Albers Super
Markets, Inc.,' was a member of the orthodox Jewish faith who conscien-
13 A subscriber who receives a copy in a damaged condition so that it cannot be
read is really not in the same position as a person who, desiring a copy for the
first time. writes the publisher for it. Neither of them has seen the libelous
article but, for purpose of the "publication v. republication" argument, there is a
difference in the nature of the act of the publisher.
14 It is recognized that, on motion for summary judgment, the court can act only
on the facts alleged and must confine itself strictly thereto: Clair v. Sears Roebuck
& Co., 34 F. Supp. 559 (1940). Since defendant did not negative the possibility
that copies might have been mailed to others than subscribers, the evidence at the
trial might show a "republication" at a later date than the original circulation
provided a republication does not require a reprinting.
15 There is much loose talk which, if accepted as stated, would make the law
very clear. Upon inspection, however, the rules announced cover only very limited
facts. In Renfro Drug Co. v. Lawson, (Tex. Com. App.) 160 S. W. (2d) 246 at
251 (1942), it was stated: "Each time a libelous article is brought to the atten-
tion of a third person, a new publication has occurred, and each publication is a
separate tort. Thus, each time a libelous book or paper or magazine is sold, a new
publication has taken place." Compare with Age-Herald Publishing Co. v. Hud-
dleston, 207 Ala. 40 at 44, 92 So. 193 at 197 (1921), where the court said: "If the
mailing of copies of libelous newspapers from the county of their primary publica-
tion into other counties amounts to a republication merely-and no other theory
seems available-then the law is well settled that the repetition or republication
of the identical libel is not a new cause of action for which a separate suit may
be maintained, but is merely an aggravation of the pre-existing cause, and in
proper cases may tend to show actual malice."
76 Ohio App. 51. 63 N. E. (2d) 218 (1945). reversing 15 Ohio Supp. 24 (1945).
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tiously followed the tenets thereof by refraining from labor during the
period from sundown Friday evening to sundown Saturday evening. Hav-
ing been released from employment covered by the local unemployment
compensation statute2 for reasons not connected with his religion, applicant
sought employment elsewhere but was not hired because of his refusal to
work on his Sabbath. He then sought unemployment compensation but
his request was denied on the ground that he was ineligible for benefits
because he was not "available for work" within the meaning of the
pertinent provisions of the statute.8 Having exhausted his administrative
remedies, he applied to the nisi prius court for relief, which court reversed
on the ground that the denial of compensation discriminated against ap-
plicant's constitutional right to the free exercise of his religious beliefs.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court and affirmed the
ruling of the administrative agency because to permit recovery would, in
fact, allow the constitutional guarantee to discriminate in applicant's
favor -whereas it directed that "no preference" should be given to any
form of religion.
Courts in many jurisdictions have held that the practice of religion
is not beyond reasonable limitation, 4 so that state may cause religious
practices to yield and subordinate themselves to laws designed to secure
the peace, welfare, and prosperity of the state. 5 While one is free to
believe what he pleases and, perhaps, to act according to that belief, his
conduct is, nevertheless, subject to regulation for the protection of society.
It would seem to follow, therefore, that he is entitled to benefits provided
by society on no different ground than those recognized for other in-
dividuals.
As applied to unemployment compensation, these principles have, as
yet, been given very little recognition. What few cases that have arisen to
date in that field have, rather, involved different factual situations. In
Keen v. Texas Unemployment Compensation Commission,6 for example,
the applicant voluntarily resigned from his position in order to attend
school during the morning hours. As he was not available for work at
full-time employment through "no fault" of his own, his willingness to
accept part-time employment was insufficient to permit a recovery of
2 Page, Ohio Gen. Code Anno., Vol. I, § 1345-1 et seq.
3 Ibid., § 1345-6(b) (1).
4 State v. Mockus, 120 Me. 84, 113 A. 39 (1921); Nicholls v. Mayor and School
Committee of Lynn, 297 Mass. 65, 7 N. E. (2d) 577 (1937); State v. Big Sheep,
75 Mont. 219, 243 P. 1067 (1926) ; City of Portland v. Thornton, 174 Ore. 508, 149 P.
(2d) 972 (1944), cert. denied 323 U. S. 770, 65 S. Ct. 123, 89 L. Ed. 616 (1944)
State v. Neitzel, 69 Wash. 567, 125 P. 939 (1912).
5 See Miner, "Religion and the Law," 21 CHTCAGO-KENT LAW REVIrw 156 (1943),
particularly pp. 162-5, and cases there cited. In addition, see Vonnegut v. Baun,
206 Ind. 172, 188 N. E. 677 (1934); City of Pineville v. Marshall, 222 Ky. 4,
299 S. W. 1072 (1927); City of Louisiana v. Bottoms, 300 S. W. (Mo. App.) 316
(1927) ; McMasters v. State, 21 Okla. Cr. 318, 207 P. 566 (1922).
6 148 S. W. (2d) (Tex. Civ. App.) 211 (1941).
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benefits. 7 A similar result was achieved in Department of Labor v. Unem-
ployment Compensation Board, where the applicant had been refused
employment because of conviction and imprisonment for larceny even
though he was willing to apply for and accept suitable employment after
his discharge.9  Allowance of benefit has also been denied where the
applicant left work for reasons of health and on the advice of his physi-
cian although the employer had indicated no intention to discharge or even
lay-off the employee temporarily.'0 In only one case, that of Stella v.
Downyflake Restaurant," does it appear that compensation was allowed
to a person who, for personal reasons, declined proferred employment
and there the refusal was not outright but merely predicated on the ground
that the applicant "did not care" for that type of work.
It may seem unfortunate that the applicant in the instant case should
find himself placed in the same category as the ambitious, the criminal, or
the sick, but if it is the policy of the law to grant unemployment compen-
sation only to those who are able and willing to work, the reasons which
impel a given applicant to refuse employment become insignificant unless
they find support in statutory sanction. In that regard, it might be
noted that the Illinois act recognizes that one may be "unavailable for
work," within the meaning of the statute, on "days which are holidays in
his religion or faith.''12 In keeping therewith, the manual dealing with
disqualification and eligibility principles, prepared by the Illinois Depart-
ment of Labor, Division of Placement and Unemployment Compensation,
gives recognition to one's right to refuse to work in this state because of
religious convictions and a claim for benefits predicated on such refusal
has been upheld by the Board of Review.' 3  In the light of that action,
judicial discussion of the question is not likely to occur here, so if recog-
nition is to be given to religious scruples, the answer would seem to be that
legislative treatment of the subject is necessary.
B. DAIDONE
7 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. 48, § 221, recognizes that a person who has been on
part-time employment may be just as eligible for compensation as a full-time
worker.
8 148 Pa. Super. 246, 24 A. (2d) 667 (1942).
0 A person is declared ineligible for benefits, if he has been discharged because of
forgery, larceny, or embezzlement in connection with his work, under Ill. Rev. Stat.
1945, Ch. 48, § 223(b) (2).
10 Department of Labor v. Unemployment C. Bd. of R., 133 Pa. Super. 518, 3 A.
(2d) 211 (1938).
11 126 Conn. 441, 11 A. (2d) 848 (1940). Compare with Bureau of Employment,
etc. v. Unemployment Comp. Bd., - Pa. Super. -, 45 A. (2d) 909 (1946).
12 111. Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. 48, § 222(c).
13 Letter to author from Samuel C. Bernstein, Commissioner of Placement and
Unemployment Compensation, dated Dec. 27, 1945, refers to a decision rendered
July 26, 1945, that "a claimant's limitation upon her availability for work to a
five-day, forty-hour week because of religious beliefs was reasonable, where all her
prior work experience indicated that she had worked full time . .. and the evi-
dence showed that she had good prospects of securing such work again."
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MORTGAGES--REQUISITES AND VALIDITY-EXTENT TO WHICH GRANTOR
IN ABSOLUTE DEED MAY RLY ON SIMULTANEOUS AGREEMENT TO SHOW
THAT DEED WAS IN FACT A MORTGAGE--In the recent partition case of
Harrison v. Harrison,' the plaintiff claimed that an absolute quit-claim
deed to a portion of the premises, given by him to one of the defendants,
was in reality a mortgage and should be so declared. He alleged that he
had found it necessary to borrow a sum of money from the grantee to
purchase an artificial leg, had given the deed as security, but found that
the grantee, after collecting all of the rents from the premises, had appro-
priated the same to his own use under a claim of ownership. The grantee
answered, among other defenses, 2 that he had purchased the grantor's in-
terest for a cash consideration, had given the latter a repurchase agree-
ment under which a reconveyance could be obtained by paying the option
price within two years, but that the grantor had failed to exercise such
option, whereby any interest of the grantor in the premises had ceased.
The chancellor found that the deed and the agreement constituted a
mortgage, that the defendant had collected enough to satisfy the debt, and
ordered partition. On appeal from such decree, the Appellate Court for
the Second District, one judge dissenting, reversed on the ground that it
was error to permit oral evidence to contradict the terms of the written
agreement made simultaneously with the deed so that, in the absence
thereof, the transaction had to stand as it was written, to-wit: a sale with
an option to repurchase.
It is unquestioned law in this state that the use of an absolute con-
veyance in lieu of a mortgage confers no greater rights on the grantee
than those which he would have obtained had a mortgage been used. That
rule has been codified into statute,3 and suits to redeem from such abso-
lute conveyances had been frequently sustained, 4 although the burden of
proof is undoubtedly on the grantor to show that the deed is a mortgage
by clear and convincing evidence. 5 It is likewise the law that if, in fact,
the transaction is one of sale rather than mortgage, the grantor has no
right to secure a reconveyance of the premises except by conforming to the
1 326 Ill. App. 678, 63 N. E. (2d) 283 (1945). Dove, P. J., dissented.
2 Issues concerning the question of laches and operation of the statute of limita-
tions are not discussed.
3 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. 95, § 13.
4 Wallace v. Greenman, 321 Ill. 423, 152 N. E. 137 (1926) ; Risser v. Patton, 232
Ill. 353, 83 N. E. 914 (1908) ; Linkemann v. Knepper, 226 Il. 473, 80 N. E. 1009
(1907); Trogdon v. Walston, 164 Ill. 144, 45 N. E. 575 (1896); Conant v. Rise-
borough, 139 Ill. 383, 28 N. E. 789 (1891) ; Hanks v. Rhodes, 128 Ill. 404, 21 N. E.
774 (1889) ; Schultz v. McCarty, 193 Ill. App. 318 (1915), cert. den. 193 Ill. App.
xii, are but a few of the cases in this state where redemption has been permitted.
5 The maxim "Probandi necesitas inoumbit illi qui agit" has applied with par-
ticular force in cases of this character ever since the decision in Taintor v. Keys,
43 Ill. 332 (1867). It has never been deviated from: Gillock v. Holdaway, 379
Ill. 467, 41 N. E. (2d) 504 (1942).
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terms of the option or agreement for reconveyance. 6 The cardinal issue
in all such cases, therefore, is to ascertain the true intention of the parties
at the time of the execution of the deed.7
The defendant in the instant case, in order to establish that a sale
rather than a mortgage occurred, offered in evidence a sealed, written
agreement between the parties made simultaneously with the deed. That
document was in the form of the customary contract for sale and purchase,
contained the usual covenant by the purchaser, plaintiff in the litigation, to
pay the stipulated price within a fixed period, gave the seller the standard
privilege to forfeit the contract and all payments thereunder in the event
of default, and provided that time was of the essence of the contract.8
The Appellate Court held that plaintiff had no right to show the true
nature of that agreement by oral testimony. There is doubt as to the
correctness of that holding.
While the ordinary person concerned in the ordinary contract wquld
be denied the right to introduce parole proof to vary the terms of a written
instrument, 9 particularly where there is no ambiguity, it does not follow
that the same rule applies when the litigant claims that the purported
agreement is merely part of a mortgage transaction. It has been said that
to " insist on what was really a mortgage, as a sale, is in equity a fraud,
which cannot be successfully practiced under the shelter of any written
papers, however precise and complete they may appear to be.',' 0 Cer-
tainly, oral testimony should be, and is, permitted to prove that the abso-
lute conveyance, despite its apparently unambiguous character, is in fact
impressed with a right of defeasance. 11 If this was not allowed, the
mortgagee could always invoke the parole evidence rule to prevent dis-
closure of the true state of affairs. There would seem to be no valid reason
why the same doctrine should not apply to other subsidiary or collateral
6 Council v. Bernard, 319 Il1. 392, 150 N. E. 272 (1926).
7 In Wallace v. Greenman, 321 Ill. 423 at 429-30, 152 N. E. 137 at 140 (1926). the
court stated: "That which equity seeks as the ultimate and essential point to be
determined in a case of this character is the intention of the parties when the
instrument purporting to be a deed absolute yeas executed." See also Kelly v.
Lehmann, 297 Ill. 33, 130 N. E. 375 (1921) ; Totten v. Totten, 294 Il. 70, 128 N. E.
295 (1920).
8 The simultaneous written agreement involved in Bane v. Pritchett, 223 I1. App.
617 (1921), on its face disclosed that the so-called "purchase" price was to be
nothing more than a "repayment" and that the grantee was to have the rents until
the premises were "redeemed as above provided." The quoted terms were re-
garded as clear evidence that the agreement was one for defeasance only.
9 Broadwell v. Broadwell, 6 Ill. (1 Gil.) 599 (1844) ; Harley v. Magnolia Petro-
leum Co., 378 Ill. 19, 37 N. E. (2d) 760, 137 A. L. R. 900 (1941).
10 Russell v. Southard, 53 U. S. (12 How.) 139 at 147, 13 L. Ed. 927 at 930
(1851). See also Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence, 5th Ed., Vol. 4, § 1193, where it
is stated: "If the instrument is in its essence a mortgage, the parties cannot by
any stipulation, however express and positive, render it anything but a mortgage,
or deprive it of the essential attributes belonging'to a mortgage in equity."
11 Hallesy v. Jackson, 66 Ill. 139 (1872).
286 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
documents making up parts of the mortgage transaction even though the
same are unambiguous in appearance. 12 In fact, it was said in Totten v.
Totten' 3 that the person seeking to establish the true character of the
transaction is not restricted to any particular kind of evidence and might
bring into consideration almost any pertinent matter tending to prove the
real intention.
But there is further reason why oral proof should have been permitted
in the instant case for the collateral agreement was not unambiguous.
Written into the repurchase contract was a statement that the conveyance
had been made by the grantor "for money advanced to him.' 1 4 It seems
doubtful that the term "advanced" would have been used had the trans-
action been one of sale for the normal expression then would have referred
to the money as "paid" rather than "advanced." The term "advance"
suggests an executory rather than a fully-executed transaction, for it indi-
cates a furnishing of something before an equivalent is received as, for
example, a payment on account of a loan. It carries the idea that a further
act is necessary to complete the transaction, such as repayment, so it
normally creates the relationship of debtor and creditor, 15 unless the money
is given as an outright gift. As the circumstances of the instant case
show no donative purpose on the part of the grantee in making the "ad-
vance," the ambiguity thus developed should have been open for explana-
tion.16 Especially should that have been the case in the light of the
holding in Illinois Trust Company v. Bibo, 17 where the Illinois Supreme
Court indicated that any doubt in a collateral agreement accompanying an
absolute deed should be resolved in favor of a mortgage transaction rather
than a sale.
The decision in the instant case also rests on the proposition that in
the absence of a debt there can be no mortgage and without a mortgage
there can be no right to redeem. That fundamental proposition cannot
be denied, and it has been used to prevent the construction of absolute
conveyances into mortgage. The case of Carraway v. Sly,' 8 quoted by the
12 Graham v. Mullins, 286 Ii1. App. 393 (1936). See also Locke's Ex'r v. Palmer,
26 Ala. 312 (1855); Smith v. Swendsen, 57 Ida. 715, 69 P. (2d) 131 (1937);
Westberg v. Wilson, 185 Minn. 307, 241 N. W. 315 (1932). Authorities contra are
collected in annotation in 111 A. L. R. 448.
13 294 Ill. 70, 128 N. E. 295 (1920). See also Kulik v. Kapusta, 303 Ii. 208,
135 N. E. 402 (1922).
14 326 Ill. App. 678 at 683, 63 N. E. (2d) 283 at 285. Italics added.
15 Laflin and Rand Powder Co. v. Burkhardt, 97 U. S. (7 Otto) 110, 24 L. Ed.
973 (1878); Hilker v. Radcliff, 274 Ill. App. 463 (1934); Linderman v. Carmin,
142 Mo. App. 519, 127 S. W. 124 (1910); Balderston v. National Rubber Co., 18
R. I. 338, 27 A. 507, 49 Am. St. Rep. 772 (1893).
16 Casper Nat. Bank v. Jenner, 268 Ill. 142, 108 N. E. 998 (1915) ; Keithley v.
Wood, 151 Ill. 566, 38 N. E. 149, 42 Am. St. Rep. 265 (1894).
17328 Ill. 352, 159 N. E. 254 (1927).
is 222 Ill. 203, 78 N. E. 588 (1906).
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court in the instant case, so indicates for it was there held that an under-
standing that the grantor could redeem "when he was able to do so" was
insufficient to require the insertion of a defeasance clause in the conveyance
as an essential element of a debt was lacking. It is likewise true that in
order to support a right to redeem there must be a reciprocal right to
foreclose. 19 As a consequence, the use of a pure option in conjunction
with an absolute conveyance has led to the denial of the right to redeem
for an optionee is never under an obligation to buy.20 It is error, how-
ever, to suppose that the collateral agreement in the instant case was
merely an option for it clearly stated that the grantor, as repurchaser,
"hereby covenants and agrees to pay" the purchase price. 21 That price
appears to have been calculated on the basis of the amount advanced
together with interest, a circumstance tending to indicate a mortgage
rather than a sale, 22 and the obligation to pay it definitely became a
debt of the grantor. Even if no formal agreement had been made, the
law would have implied an obligation to repay the sum advanced 2s as
it was clearly not a gift, so it would not have been difficult for the
grantee to have established a debt had he ever desired, or found it
necessary, to foreclose the equitable mortgage thus resulting.
Had the transaction truly been one of sale with a contract for re-
purchase, 24 the obligation to pay the repurchase price, while it would
19 Fitch v. Miller, 200 Il1. 170, 65 N. E. 650 (1902) ; Green v. Capps, 142 Ill. 286.
31 N. E. 597 (1892).
20 Council v. Bernard, 319 Ill. 392, 150 N. E. 272 (1926); Williams v. Griffith,
310 Ill. App. 574, 35 N. E. (2d) 95 (1941).
21 326 Ill. App. 678 at 682, 63 N, E. (2d) 283 at 285.
22 While inadequacy of price paid is not necessarily an indication of a mortgage,
Story v. Springer, 155 IIl. 25, 39 N. E. 570 (1895), it is a factor to be taken into
consideration: McDonnell v. Holden, 352 Ill. 362, 185 N. E. 572 (1933); Totten v.
Totten, 294 Ill. 70, 128 N. E. 295 (1920) ; Helm v. Boyd, 124 Ill. 370, 16 N. E. 85
(1888).
23 See cases cited in note 15, ante. In Third National Bank v. Norris, 331 Ill.
230 at 236, 162 N. E. 829, at 831 (1928), the repurchase contract contained no
promise to pay the price, so the court properly remarked: "A sale with the mere
privilege in the vendor to repurchase, where the vendor does not undertake to re-
purchase and assumes no obligation to pay the purchase price, is not a mortgage."
A similar holding was reached in Pitts v. Cable, 44 Ill. 103 (1867), where the
grantee gave a unilateral bond to convey. The repurchase contract involved in
Gannon v. Moles, 209 Ill. 180, 70 N. E. 689 (1904), however, like the one in the
instant case, contained a covenant on the part of the original grantor to repay the
purchase price so the court found a sufficient "debt" to support the idea that the
absolute deed had, at least for a time, been a mortgage. The decision in Crane v.
Chandler, 190 Ill. 584, 60 N. E. 826 (1901), is obviously erroneous since the court
there, failing to distinguish between an option to repurchase and a covenant to do
so, held there was no "debt" when the resale contract definitely disclosed that the
repurchasing grantor agreed "to pay" the purchase price.
24 Cases involving situations wherein absolute conveyances have been held to be
mortgages because prior evidence of indebtedness, such as notes, etc., were not
cancelled, are beyond the scope of this topic. With regard thereto, see Smith,
"When a Deed by Mortgagor to Mortgagee is an Absolute Conveyance," 15 CHICAGO-
KENT LAW RvIEw 265 (1937).
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have been a "debt", would not have supported the right to redeem since
no property would have been pledged as security. But in the light of
the circumstances in the instant case, it would seem that the Appellate
Court erred in rejecting the evidence offered to show the true nature
of the transaction for it tended to disclose that a true sale and repurchase
was never intended. If necessitous borrowers are not permitted to show
that collateral agreements for repurchase, no matter how precise and
complete they appear to be, are really defeasance clauses in disguise,
a way has been developed for crafty lenders to defeat a right of re-
demption over which equity courts have long watched with jealous eyes.
J. E. JACOBS.
RAILROADS--OPERATION-MAY JURY CONSIDER WHETHER OR NOT
FAILURE TO GIVE STATUTORY WARNING WAS PROXIMATE CAUSE OF INJURY
ARISING FROM RAILROAD CROSSING ACCIDENT-An action by the conserva-
trix of the estate of a person rendered mentally incompetent because of
injuries sustained in a railroad crossing accident while riding as a guest
in an automobile was begun in Berg v. New York Central Railroad
Company.1  The testimony disclosed that both the passenger and the
driver were aware of the crossing, were listening for a train which they
knew was about due, and recognized that their view of the crossing was
obstructed. There was evidence of a negative character 2 tending to
show that the engineer of the approaching train did not sound his whistle
as required by statute.8 When the train came in sight, the driver applied
the brakes but the car skidded on the icy pavement. Realizing that he
could not stop, the driver accelerated the motor and attempted to cross
in front of the train but the rear end of the car was struck by the
locomotive. The evidence also clearly showed that there was no negligence
on the part of the driver or the incompetent and that, but for the ice,
the car could have been stopped. A verdict in favor of the plaintiff
was returned by the trial jury. Defendant's motion for judgment not-
1 391 Ill. 52, 62 N. E. (2d) 676 (1945), affirming 323 II. App. 221, 55 N. E. (2d)
394 (1944).
2 While positive evidence is to be given greater weight that negative testimony,
Frizbell v. Cole, 42 Ill. 362 (1866), it must be remembered that important distinc-
tions exist between negative and positive evidence. Where a witness testifies that
he heard a conversation or a sound, he gives positive evidence. If another is also
present but testifies that he did not hear the conversation or sound, this will be
negative evidence if it is shown that he did not have an equal opportunity to hear
or that he was paying less attention than the other. If, on the other hand, the
party who testifies that he did not hear the sound was paying attention and had
an equal opportunity to hear it, his testimony can be considered as being positive
in character, even though negative in form: Chicago Consolidated Traction Co. v.
Gervens, 113 Ill. App. 275 (1904) ; Ohio & Mississippi Ry. Co. v. Mueller, 46 II1.
App. 109 (1892) ; St. L., A. & T. H. R. R. Co. v. Odum, 52 Ill. App. 519 (1894),
affirmed in 156 Ill. 78, 40 N. E. 559 (1895).
3 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. 114, § 59.
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withstanding the verdict was overruled. Upon appeal to the Appellate
Court for the Third District, that court reversed without remanding on
the ground that the trial court erred in sending the case to the jury,
because the evidence merely showed that the car could have been stopped
except for the ice on the pavement but did not indicate what might
have happened if the signal required by law had been given. 4 That court
also indicated that, as a matter of law, the negligence of the railroad
company was not the proximate cause of the accident, that the icy con-
dition was, and that to permit the jurors to delve into what might have
happened had the whistle been blown would allow them to enter the
realm of speculation and guesswork. As the plaintiff had not clearly
shown that the injury was the proximate result of the failure to blow
the whistle, it was deemed improper to deny defendant's motion for
judgment notwithstanding the verdict. Certificate of importance was
granted by the Illinois Supreme Court, but after consideration it affirmed
the decision of the Appellate Court.
Without question, in order to make out a case of actionable negli-
gence, the plaintiff must not only prove the negligence charged5 but he
must also prove that the wrongful act or omission was the efficient cause
of the injury.6 In other words, the defendant's negligence must be the
''proximate", "legal", or "responsible" cause of the injury. The chain
of causation connecting the injury sustained to the negligent act or
omission is made up of factual links which the jury, as trier of the
facts, 7 must find present in order to determine just what constitutes
the proximate cause. 8 The rule is the same whether the cause is an
intervening one, 9 or is said to be concurrent.' 0 Only when the facts are
undisputed, so that a reasonable man could be led to only one conclusion
or inference, can the court step in and declare, as a matter of law, just
what was the cause of an accident."
This last principle would seem to be the one used by the court in
4 323 Ill. App. 221, 55 N. E. (2d) 394 (1944).
5 Pickering v. Corson, 108 F. (2d) 546 (1940) ; Crandall v. Stop & Shop, 288 fli.
App. 543, 6 N. E. (2d) 685 (1937).
6 Walalte v. Chicago R. I. & P. Ry. Co., 376 11. 59, 33 N. E. (2d) 119 (1941);
Wintersteen v. National Cooperage & Woodenware Co., 341 I. 95, 197 N. E. 578
(1935).
7 Bishop v. Busse, 69 Ill. 403 (1873); Graham v. Dressen, 292 Ill. App. 15, 10
N. E. (2d) 843 (1937).
s Klas v. Yellow Cab Co., 106 F. (2d) 935 (1939) ; Phillabaum v. L. E. & W. R. R.
Co., 315 Ill. 131, 145 N. E. 806 (1924).
9 Koch v. City of Chicago, 297 I1. App. 103, 17 N. E. (2d) 411 (1938).
lo Chicago City Ry. Co. v. O'Donnell, 109 Ill. App. 616 (1903), affirmed in 207
Ill. 478, 69 N. E. 882 (1904).
11Merlo v. Public Service Company, 581 Ill. 300, 45 N. E. (2d) 665 (1943);
Schultz v. Henry Ericsson Co., 264 Ill. 156, 106 N. E. 236 (1914) ; Hill v. Hiles, 309
Ill. App. 321, 32 N. E. (2d) 933 (1941).
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the instant case, for it said: "The undisputed facts lead to the conclusion
that the icy condition of the street was the proximate cause of the injury
and not defendant's wrongful act. Under such circumstances, there was
no question of fact for the jury. '"12 However, a reasonable man might
have drawn a different conclusion or inference, to-wit: that if the whistle
had been blown, the accident would have been averted. The Supreme
Court makes no definite statement as to just why it would not permit
such different inference to be drawn, although the Appellate Court
predicated its decision on the fact that there was no direct evidence
offered from which any other conclusion or inference could be reached.
According to it, the plaintiff, seeking to establish proximate causation in
the instant case, would have had to show that the giving of the signal
would have prevented the accident 13 Sustaining such a burden would
necessitate the introduction of evidence to raise more than a speculation
or a conjecture, 14 so unless this was done the case ought not go to the
jury., 5
While it is the duty of a court to rule, as a matter of law, as to
whether the evidence is sufficient to take the case to the jury,' 6 it must
be remembered that the "fact of causation is incapable of mathematical
proof, since no man can say with absolute certainty what would have
happened if the defendant had acted otherwise.'"17 A plaintiff, therefore,
need only prove with reasonable certainty that the act or omission was
the cause of the injury' s and, for that purpose, direct evidence is not
always necessary' 9 as circumstantial evidence will suffice.20 A jury should
not be permitted to speculate as to proximate cause, but it can draw
reasonable presumptions or inferences, 2 ' hence the question in the instant
case really becomes one as to whether or not there was sufficient evidence
for the jury to draw reasonable inferences as to what might have taken
place if the signal had been given. The Illinois court seemed to feel
that the necessary inferences would have to be based upon speculation
12 391 Ill. 52 at 66, 62 N. E. (2d) 676 at 683.
13 Illinois Central R. R. Co. v. Phelps, 29 Ill. 447 (1862) ; T. W. & W. R. R. Co. v.
Jones, 76 Ill. 311 (1875) ; 0. & M. Ry. Co. v. Reed, 40 Ill. App. 47 (1891).
14 Deming v. Hallberg, 221 Ill. App. 180 (1921); McCormick H. M. Co. v. Gabris,
130 Il1. App. 624 (1907).
15 Webster Mfg. Co. v. Goodrich, 104 Ill. App. 76 (1902).
16 McClure v. Hoopeston Gas & Electric Co., 303 Ill. 89, 135 N. E. 43, 25 A. L.
R. 250 (1922), affirming 221 I1. App. 668 (1921); Seymour v. Union Stockyards &
Transit Co., 224 Ill. 579, 79 N. E. 950 (1907); Lotesto v. Baker, 246 I1. App.
425 (1927).
17 Prosser, Handbook of the Law of Torts (West Pub. Co., St. Paul, Minn., 1941),
p. 325.
18 L. S. & M. S. Ry. Co. v. Petersen, 86 Ill. App. 375 (1900).
19 Beesley v. Chicago, 170 Il1. App. 37 (1912).
20Devine v. Delano, 272 Ill. 166, 111 N. E. 742 (1916).
21 Michalec v. Hutchison, 123 Ohio St. 494, 176 N. E. 79 (1931).
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and not upon facts. Courts in other jurisdictions have reached the same
conclusion where like facts were involved, 22 but there are cases which
hold differently. 28 As the facts in each individual case are of utmost
importance in determining this issue, it is impossible to lay down any
hard and fast rule. By following the mental gymnastics that a given
jury might have to perform to reach a solution to this problem, however,
a better understanding of what the court is driving at can be reached.
The jury would first have to presume that, if the signal had been
given, it would have been heard. It has been said that such an inference
would be unreasonable as there could be many circumstances which might
prevent the sound from being heard.24 For one thing, the occupants
of the automobile might have been hard of hearing, but there is a pre-
sumption that a party has normal bodily functions 25 including a normal
sense of hearing, 26 so that circumstance could be eliminated. Persons
with normal or even exceptional hearing may fail to hear sound when
it is within hearing range, 27 but this usually occurs because attention is
not being paid or the person is not interested in such sound.28 Where a
person is approaching a known crossing in the dead of night with a
slippery pavement underneath, conscious that a train is due, he will most
likely be attentive and interested. In fact, there was evidence in the
instant case to that effect. It is unsafe, therefore, to assume that a party
would not hear a signal if it were given,29 although it is impossible to
infer, as a matter of law, that even though he is listening and the signal
is given, he would hear it.80
Other conditions might drown out sound or carry it away; for
22 Hickey v. Missouri Pacific Railroad Corp.. 8 F. (2d) 128 (1925); Megan v.
Stevens, 91 F. (2d) 419 (1937): Barrett v. United States Railroad Administra-
tion, 196 Iowa 1143, 194 N. W. 222 (1923); Pifer v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co.,
215 Iowa 1258, 247 N. W. 625 (1933); Stroud v. Chicago, M. St. P. & P. By. Co.,
75 Mont. 384, 243 P. 1089 (1926) ; Kramers v. Chesaibeake & 0. Ry. Co., 60 Ohio
App. 556, 22 N. E. (2d) 227 (1939); Gilman v. Central Vermont Railway Co.,
93 Vt. 340, 107 A. 122 (1919).
23 Saeugling v. Scandrett, 230 Iowa 153, 296 N. W. 787 (1941); Leavell v.
Thompson, (Mo. App.) 176 S. W. (2d) 854 (1943); Sisk v. Chicago, B. & Q. R.
Co., (Mo. App.) 67 S. W. (2d) 830 (1934); Williams v. Thompson, (Mo. App.)
166 S. W. (2d) 785 (1942).
24 Kramers v. Chesapeake & 0. Ry. Co., 60 Ohio App. 556, 22 N. E. (2d) 227
(1939). The evidence therein showed that a strong wind was blowing at the
time.
25 Murphy v. National Ice Cream Co., 114 Cal. App. 482, 300 P. 91 (1931) ; Texas
Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Birdwell, 39 S. W. (2d) (Tex. Civ. App.) 159 (1931).
26 Vansandt v. Brewer, 209 Ala. 131, 95 So. 463 (1923); Green v. Southern Pac.
Co., 122 Cal. 563, 55 P. 577 (1898).
27 Anderson v. Horlick's Malted Milk Co., 137 Wis. 569, 119 N. W. 342 (1909).
28 Holmes v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 74 N. J. L. 469, 66 A. 412 (1907) ; Seviour v.
Rutland R. Co., 88 Vt. 107, 91 A. 1039 (1914).
29 Chisholm v. Seaboard Airline Ry. Co., 121 S. C. 394, 114 S. E. 500 (1922).
30 Morrison v. Boston & M. R. R., 86 N. H. 176, 164 A. 553 (1933).
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instance, noise or wind. It is common knowledge -that a signal given
by a train is louder than the ordinary noise made by such train,3 ' but
noise produced by other vehicles could prevent the hearing of a signal.8 "
What might the jury have found in the instant case on that score? The
vicinity of the crossing was deserted except for the train and the car in
which the injured person was riding. It was the dead of night, when
noise is at a minimum. There must have been some evidence as to the
condition of the automobile in order to refute any claim of contributory
negligence, and very likely some evidence as to its make and age. With
these facts, plus their own experience and common knowledge about
automobiles,3 3 the jury could readily have decided whether or not that
particular car could have been making noise great enough to drown out
a train whistle, if it was blown. Wind can carry away sound,34 and
storm can deaden it.35  Was it a stormy or windy night? There must
have been some description of the night, in the testimony of the witnesses,
from which the jury could have gathered whether or not there was a
wind or storm present. If no such description was given, the jurors
would have no basis for reaching a logical conclusion on this subject as
they may only take into consideration evidence submitted on the trial
and not facts within their personal or special knowledge. 36 But, even
if there was no direct evidence as to the presence or intensity of any
wind or storm, there was evidence in the case to the effect that several
witnesses heard the rumble of the approaching train. If noise made by
the train itself was heard above any wind or storm that might have
been present, such weather conditions could scarcely have affected the
sound from a whistle or bell if they were not strong enough to drown
out the rumble. The jury could reasonably and logically infer, therefore,
that had a warning been sounded it could, and would, have been heard.
The next inference .necessary would require the jury to be able
31 Underwood v. St. Louis, I. M. & S. By. Co., 190 Mo. App. 407, 177 S. W.
724 (1915).
32 Davis v. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. Co., 159 F. 10 (1907). For other cases in
which different types of noises served to drown out the signal, see 11 Neg. &
Comp. Cas. Ann. (N. S.) 622.
33 It has been held that, since automobiles have become so commonplace and
as everyone in his daily experience comes in contact with them, jurors may, in
considering cases involving automobiles, use their common experience with these
vehicles: Blue Diamond Motor Bus Co. v. Hale, 69 S. W. (2d) (Tex. Civ. App.)
228 (1934).
34 Davis v. Boggs, 22 Ariz. 497, 199 P. 116 (1921); Gorton v. Harmon, 152
Mich. 473, 116 N. W. 443 (1908); Blauvelt v. Erie R. Co., 81 N. J. L. 142, 78 A.
1048 (1911) ; Holland v. Northern Pac. Ry. Co., 55 Wash. 266, 104 P. 252 (1909);
Shaffer v. Minneapolis, St. P. & S. S. M. Ry. Co., 156 Wis. 485, 145 N. W. 1086
(1914).
35 Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Ueltschi's Ex'rs., 29 Ky. L. Rep. 1136, 937 S. W. 14
(1906).
36 Ottawa Gas, Light & Coke Co. v. Graham, 28 Ill. 73 (1862); Bohn v. Chi-
cago & N. W. Ry. Co., (Iowa) 78 N. W. 200 (1899), not officially reported.
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to say that if the whistle was sounded and heard, it would have been
heard before the train was actually seen by the occupants of the car.
The very language of the statute,8 7 requiring that a whistle be sounded
eighty rods from the point of any crossing, would seem to indicate that
it was the intention of the legislature to protect the general public s by
seeing to it that they have sufficient timely notice of the presence of the
approaching train in order to take steps to protect themselves. Many
crossings, as in the instant case, are obscured by natural or artificial
obstructions, so that the only notice of the presence of a train which
would be of any value would have to come from some type of signal,
which could be heard before the train was sighted. As the statute calls
for a bell of particular weight or a whistle of a particular type, the
inference could well be drawn that these mechanical devices are sufficient,
if used, for the purposes for which they were intended. By a simple
mathematical calculation, it is possible to compute the approximate
whereabouts of a given car on the highway at the time when the whistle
should have been blown. The car in the instant case was 76 feet from
the track when the train was first sighted some three hundred feet from
the intersection. If the whistle had been sounded at the proper time,
the train would have been 1320 feet from the crossing, while the car
would have been approximately 450 feet from it.39 Sound travels at
such speed 40 that the whistle could have been heard well within two
seconds from the time the signal was given. During those two seconds,
the car would have travelled approximately 35 feet, leaving it still
over four hundred feet from the crossing. The evidence showed that
the automobile driver had stopped for an intersection at a point 370
feet from the crossing, so it would not be unreasonable to infer that he
would have either been at a standstill or crossing the intersection in low
37 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1945, Ch. 114, § 59.
38 L., E. & St. L. Con. R. R. Co. v. Lee, 47 Ill. App. 384 (1893); Williams v.
C. & A. R. R. Co., 32 Ill. App. 339 (1890), affirmed in 135 Ill. 491, 26 N. E. 661,
11 L. R. A. 352, 25 Am. St. Rep. 397 (1891).
39 The train was sighted by the occupants of the car when it was 300 feet
from the crossing. By statute, the whistle should have been blown when the train
was 80 rods or 1320 feet from the crossing. Thus, it had travelled a distance of
1020 feet from the point where it should have blown its whistle to the point
where it was sighted. Knowing that the speed of the train was 60 miles per
hour or 88 feet per second, by dividing the rate of speed into the distance trav-
elled, it required 11.5 seconds for the train to cover the intervening distance.
During those same 11.5 seconds, the car was approaching the crossing at a rate
of 20-25 miles per hour or at the rate of 33 feet per second. Multiplying the
elapsed time period by that rate of speed, it appears that the car travelled a
distance of 380 feet between the time when the train whistle should have been
sounded until the time the train was sighted. As the car was still 76 feet
distant from the track at the time the train was sighted, its distance from the
crossing at the time when the whistle should have been sounded would be the
sum of the two distances, I. e. 380 plus 76, or a total of 456 feet.
40 In Pearcey v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 163 Va. 928, 177 S. E. 843
(1935), the court took judicial notice of the speed of sound.
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gear at a time when the signal should have reached him.4 1  In the light
of these facts, the jury could well have concluded that the occupants of
the car would have had ample time to protect themselves had due warn-
ing been given.
From that point, the jury could then progress to the question as to
what would have happened when, and if, the occupants of the auto-
mobile heard the whistle. In a somewhat similar case, it was pointed
out that the party might not even heed the warning whistle. 42 The
driver there, however, was unacquainted with the stretch of road and
did not know of the proximity of the crossing. In contrast, the situation
in the instant case was entirely different for the driver knew of the
railroad crossing, saw it, and knew that a train was due. It is safe to
say that he would have connected the sound of a whistle with the fact
of the approaching train and would have realized that it was up to him
to take heed. In view of the average person's love for his life,43 it
cannot be presumed that he would have deliberately driven in front of
the oncoming train. He undoubtedly would have tried to stop, but the
query is just where would he have made the attempt? The Iowa court
in Barrett v. United States Railroad Administration,44 demonstrating the
speculation that would have to be indulged in, asserted that the driver
might have proceeded toward the crossing thinking that he could have
stopped short of that point. But there the ice was hidden, was to be
found only at the crossing, and the driver was ignorant of the condition.
Thinking that he could stop, he might well have gone that far.
Again the contrast is strong, for in the present case the ice was a
general condition and well-known to the driver who probably would not
have waited until he reached the crossing to apply his brakes. The jury
could have found that he would have attempted to stop, knowing the
condition of the road, as soon as he heard the signal or shortly there-
after. As has been pointed out, at the time for the signal he would
have been a great deal farther from the track than he was when he was
compelled to act. It is doubtful whether he would have skidded at that
point or have skidded very far, because the car would have either been
at a standstill at the intersection, or it would have been in low gear
as he proceeded across it. In either case, he would have had complete
control over the car. Even assuming that skidding would inevitably have
41 Of course, the whistle could have been given improperly, but there is a pre-
sumption that a statutory duty of this nature will be performed properly: White
v. Arizona Eastern R. Co., 30 Ariz. 151, 245 P. 270 (1926). See also 0. & M.
Ry. Co. v. Reed, 40 Ill. App. 47 (1891).
42 Kramers v. Chesapeake & 0. Ry. Co., 60 Ohio App. 556, 22 N. E. (2d) 227
(1939).
43 Lauer v. Elgin, J. & E. Ry. Co., 305 Ill. App. 200, 27 N. E. (2d) 315 (1940).
44 196 Iowa 1143, 194 N. W. 222 (1923).
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occurred, the jury might have found that he could have driven off the
road or could have done exactly what he did do in the instant case,
that he speeded up so as to cross before the train reached the inter-
section. He almost made it and, had he known sooner, he could have
made it. In order to come to any one of the foregoing conclusions, the
jury would have been aided by the testimony as to the description of
the crossing, which was very minute in detail, and would scarcely have
been obliged to rely purely on surmise and conjecture.
There was no direct testimony, of course, on the part of the injured
person or of the driver as to what might have happened or could have
happened if the whistle had been blown. An unsupported statement that
the driver would have stopped sooner or would have done any one of
a number of things would not have been sufficient and, probably, would
have been excluded because lacking in evidentiary value.4 5 Neither of
the reviewing courts in Illinois were willing to signify the kind of
evidence that the plaintiff should have submitted on this particular
question. It is hard to imagine what the plaintiff could have shown other
than what was already put before the court. All that could have been
done was to show the location and speed of the car, give a description
of the crossing and the surrounding physical features and let the jury
decide the rest. These details were testified to by different witnesses
and it was a very close question as to whether or not the evidence was
sufficient. It would seem, if there was doubt, that as our system of
jurisprudence is tied so closely to jury trial, the case should have been
left to the jury instead of being determined by the court. The latter
would be compelled to do as much "speculation" as that objected to
here and might not do it as well. 4"
W. HEINDL.
45 Hickey v. Missouri Pacific Railroad Corp., 8 F. (2d) 128 (1925).
46 In Saeugling v. Scandrett, 230 Iowa 153 at 156, 296 N. W. 787 at 788, the
court refused so to do, saying: ". . . we do not feel that we should substitute
our judgment for that of the jury on the fact question whether had the signals
been given they would have been heard, and, being heard, whether the automobile
would have stopped out of the zone of danger."
